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Abstract 
 
This paper claims that technical progress induces early retirement of older workers. 
Technical progress erodes some existing technology specific human capital. Since 
older workers have shorter career horizons, there is smaller incentive for them or for 
their employers to invest in learning how to use the new technology. Consequently, 
they are more likely to stop working. Using individual data, we find support for this 
erosion effect, as early retirement is positively correlated to the sector’s rate of 
technical progress. At the aggregate level, the effect of technical progress on labor 
supply of older workers is mixed. It falls in innovating sectors due to the above 
erosion effect, but it increases in other sectors due to higher wages. This is the wage 
effect. US time series aggregate data demonstrate that the overall effect of technical 
progress on aggregate labor force participation of the old is negative. Namely, the 
erosion effect dominates. 
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Technical Progress and Early Retirement 
1. Introduction 
The number of workers who quit working before they reach the formal age of retirement is 
surprisingly high in modern economies. In 1996 the average labor force participation rate in 
OECD countries of men in ages 55-64 was 63.6 percent, while labor force participation rate for 
men in ages 25-54 was 93.1 percent. Furthermore, it is quite a recent phenomenon. Labor 
participation rates for US men in ages 55-64 dropped from 86.7 percent in 1948 to 62.6 percent 
in 1996. Early retirement is usually attributed to bad health, and to wealth, intensified by 
generous retirement plans like social security. This paper offers a third explanation to early 
retirement: erosion of human capital by technical progress. 
Technical progress changes continuously the way we produce goods and services. It 
introduces new goods, new machines, and new production methods. Simultaneously it creates 
new professions and destroys old ones. New technologies always make some existing human 
capital obsolete, while creating demand for new types of human capital. This paper claims that as 
a result, technical progress reduces labor of older workers. It affects older workers more than 
younger ones, since their career horizon is much shorter. Hence it is less beneficial for them, or 
for their employers, to invest in learning new technologies. The paper models this idea 
theoretically, examines its implications and tests them, using both micro and macro US data, and 
finds significant support for it. 
 The main idea is presented in a simple growth model where production is organized in 
sectors. Each sector uses a specific technology, which requires specific human capital. 
Individuals learn and acquire technology-specific professions when young and then work using 
these technologies. Meanwhile, new innovations arrive and replace existing technologies. The 
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new technologies are more productive, but require learning. While all young workers learn to use 
the new and more productive technologies, some older workers do not learn, since their career 
horizon is much shorter. Those who do not learn can either stick to the less productive 
technologies, in which case they have lower income due to competition from the young in their 
sector, or retire early. Thus, technical progress raises the probability of early retirement. Note 
that while this paper models the decision to retire early as a worker’s decision, for reasons of 
tractability, in real life it is many times a decision made by the employer, who prefers not to 
retrain an older worker on the job. If the worker becomes unemployed at old age, he usually 
retires after some futile search for a new job.  The basic result is the same. 
The theoretical model is important beyond the basic idea, as it helps in forming the 
empirical tests of how technical progress affects early retirement, and especially it helps in 
forming a test of the reverse causality hypothesis. Most importantly, the theoretical model leads 
us to the above distinction between the erosion effect and the wage effect at the aggregate level. 
That also leads to the aggregate empirical test. So, while one of our tests is similar to that of 
Bartel and Sicherman (1993), who also examine the relationship between technical progress and 
labor supply of older workers across sectors, our approach is different, as it is based on an 
analytical model that leads to many additional tests.  
One main empirical implication of the model is therefore that the probability of being out 
of work for older workers should be positively correlated with the rate of technical progress 
across sectors. The model also analyzes the aggregate effect of technical progress on 
participation by older workers in the economy as a whole and shows that this aggregate effect is 
ambiguous. On one hand, during periods of rapid technical progress, more sectors have new 
technologies and in these sectors more old workers retire. This is called the erosion effect, as it 
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reflects erosion of human capital. On the other hand, wages rise in periods of high technical 
progress and that has a positive effect on labor supply of older workers in other sectors. This is 
the wage effect. Clearly, the two effects are opposing. 
 The paper examines the empirical predictions of the model using US data. We first 
examine the effect of sector technical progress on the labor status of individual men over the age 
of 50. The data on individual labor decisions are from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
which also includes information on job histories. This information is merged with sector 
productivity growth data, measured by Jorgensen (2000), after some adjustments. We find that 
the coefficient of sector TFP growth on the probability that older men do not work is positive. 
We also examine the possibility that this result is biased due to reverse causality, which might 
occur if sectors differ by lay-offs of older workers, and if the less productive workers are laid-
off. We test an implication of such a possibility and reject it. 
 We next study the aggregate effect of technical progress. We examine the relationship 
between the average rate of technical progress in the US and the aggregate labor supply of older 
workers over time. This test compares the two opposite effects: the erosion effect and the wage 
effect. Since aggregate TFP growth rates reflect both technical progress and temporary shocks we 
use the Blanchard and Quah (1989) Structural VAR methodology to identify the two shocks. Our 
test shows that the effect of technical progress on labor force participation of men over 55 is 
indeed negative. Hence, the erosion effect dominates the wage effect. 
This paper is most closely related to two different lines of research. One is research on 
early retirement of old workers and its explanations, and the other is research on the effects of 
technical progress on the labor market. Most of the literature on early retirement focuses on 
wealth, which has increased in recent decades due to economic growth and to institutions such as 
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Social Security and pension funds. Such explanations appear in Stock and Wise (1990), 
Diamond and Gruber (1999), Costa (1998), Gruber and Wise (1997) and Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2000).1 This paper suggests that the erosion effect of technical progress is an 
additional explanation to early retirement. This idea has been previously mentioned by Peracchi 
and Welch (1994), but this paper develops the idea further and presents it in a full general 
equilibrium theoretical model.2  
The paper is also related to the literature on the effects of technical progress on labor 
markets. A number of recent theoretical papers, such as Aghion and Howitt (1994), Helpman and 
Trajtenberg (1998), Hornstein and Krusell (1996), and Galor and Moav (2000), claim that 
technical progress reduces employment due to costs of learning new technologies. This paper 
shows that this effect is stronger for older workers, whose career horizon is short. There are also 
some recent empirical papers, which study the effect of technical progress on the labor market, 
and find that technological innovations are followed by short-run unemployment. This is shown 
in Gali (1999) and in many other papers that he cites. Our paper is highly relevant to these 
papers, since it shows that the effect they find is due mainly to the negative effect on 
employment of older workers, and it does not hold for younger workers.3 Thus our tests suggest 
a very different interpretation to these findings. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of technical 
progress, training and retirement. Section 3 describes the equilibrium, finds various effects that 
cause early retirement, focusing on the effect of technical progress. Section 4 describes the 
                                                 
 1 A theoretical analysis of how social security affects retirement appears already in Feldstein (1974).  
2 Two theoretical papers are related to our model. Boucekkine et al (2002) discusses economic growth and 
retirement, but has no erosion of human capital. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) describe a model with erosion of 
technology-specific human capital, but without retirement. Our model combines the two approaches together.  
3 Another recent paper that points at the relationship between technology and age is Friedberg (1999), who shows 
that older workers use computers less than younger workers. 
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empirical implications of the model, Section 5 presents and evaluates the empirical results on the 
effect of technical progress across sectors, Section 6 reports the aggregate results, and the last 
section concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a small open economy in a world with one final good. The final good is produced by a 
continuum of intermediate goods i∈[0, 1]. The production of the final good is described by the 
following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(1) , idxy tit ∫=
1
0
,loglog
where yt is output of the final good, and xi,t are inputs of the intermediate goods. Time is discrete. 
The intermediate goods are produced by labor with fixed marginal productivity. A worker who 
uses the available technology in period t produces an amount ai,t of the intermediate good i in a 
unit of time. This technology is not freely available, as it requires training and learning. Using a 
technology is therefore a specific profession for which workers need to train. 
 We next describe technical progress. Each period new technologies of producing 
intermediate goods, which replace the old technologies, arrive exogenously. These new 
technologies are more productive, namely: 
(2)  .,1,, tititi baa −=
We assume that 1 . The lower bound is of course the case of no technical progress, 
while the upper bound is fairly reasonable. The sector’s rate of technical progress is log b
2, ≤≤ tib
i,t. The 
new technologies for time t become known in the beginning of the period. The rate of technical 
progress log bi,t is independent and identically distributed over time.  
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We next add some structural assumptions on the correlation between rates of technical 
progress across sectors. These structural assumptions are used only in the macroeconomic part of 
the analysis. We assume that the rates of technical progress are correlated across sectors in each 
period. Namely, when technical progress is high, it is high in many sectors. This assumption is 
also supported by the data.4 Formally we assume that the sector's rate of technical progress can 
be decomposed into an aggregate component gt and a sector component in the following way: 
(3)  .log ,, tittti sggb +=
According to the assumptions above the average rate of technical progress gt is an i.i.d. process 
with a positive expectation g and the sector relative component si,t is a white noise, independent 
both over time and across sectors. In order to ensure that the rate of technical progress in a sector 
is non-negative, we assume that 1, −≥tis . 
 Individuals live two periods each in overlapping generations. Population is fixed and 
each generation is a mass of size 1. In first period of life each person acquires a profession i and 
supplies 1 unit of labor. In second period of life a person can either supply L units of labor in the 
former technology, where L<1, or retrain and learn the new technology but work less, or retire. 
To retrain the worker uses f time, where f is a personal measure of effort of retraining. Hence, he 
supplies only L – f units of labor in second period of life.5 For analytical convenience assume 
that part time work is spread uniformly throughout the period. The personal measure of effort f 
differs across individuals and is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and F, where 
. This distribution reflects many things: level of education, quality of training 
system, supply of on-the-job training, etc. If the worker retires he has no income in the second 
LFL <<2/
                                                 
4 This assumption reflects the fact that many technological innovations are quite general and spread across sectors. 
5 In principle the learning time should depend on the size of the innovation as well, namely on bi,t. This addition to 
the model does not change the main results and is not included here to simplify the exposition only. 
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period of life, but he enjoys utility from retirement, which also differs across individuals.6 For 
tractability we assume that individuals consume in the second period of life only. Formally, the 
utility function is 
(4) )1log(log hcu ++= δ , 
where c is consumption when old, δ  is 1 if the worker retires and 0 if not, and  is utility 
from retirement, which is individual. We assume that h is uniformly distributed between 0 and H, 
and is independent of f. An individual therefore faces two decisions during lifetime. When young 
he chooses a profession. When old he chooses between one of the three mutually exclusive 
options: retire, retrain and work with the new technology, or work with the old technology. 
hlog
 As mentioned above, the economy is small and open. We assume that the final good is 
fully traded, while labor and intermediate goods are non-traded. Capital is fully mobile and the 
world interest rate is equal to r.7 Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive and 
expectations are rational. In order to simplify the analysis we further assume that there is no 
insurance for employment risk. 
 
3. Equilibrium 
3.1. Wages and Income 
The young choose professions according to expected income. They know which technologies 
will be used and hence they know output and price levels as well. Due to Cobb-Douglas 
production (1), demand for intermediate good i in period t is described by: 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, Ashenfelter and Card (2001) find that the elimination of compulsory retirement for professors has 
caused them to retire at different ages. This shows that retirement preferences are heterogeneous.  
7 Note that individuals only lend in this economy. Borrowers are from abroad and not modeled. It is easy though to 
add borrowers to the model, either as a government or as firms. 
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Prices of all goods are in terms of the final good, the numeraire. Choice of sectors by the young 
equates expected incomes pi,tai,t across sectors, through adjustments of xi,t.8 Denote the common 
real income of the young across sectors by wt and call it the wage rate: 
(6)  .allfor,, iapw titit =
We next calculate this equilibrium real wage. First, note that (5) and (6) yield: 
(7) 
t
t
ti
ti
t
ti w
ya
p
yx ,
,
, == . 
Substitute (7) in (1) and get: 
(8) . ∫=
1
0
,loglog diaw tit
Hence, the wage is equal to the average state of technology. The rate of change of wages is 
(9) . ttitt gdibww ==− ∫−
1
0
,1 logloglog
Since labor is the only factor of production, the rate of change of wages is equal to the average 
rate of technical progress across sectors, which in this model is equal to the growth rate of total 
factor productivity (TFP). 
 We next describe workers’ incomes in the second period of life. Note first that due to 
homogeneity the price of each intermediate good is the same for all producers, young and old. 
Hence, the wage rate of an old worker who retrains is the same as that of the young, wt. A worker 
who does not retrain faces competition from younger workers with a better technology and earns 
                                                 
 8 Workers care about the future t+1 wages as well, but these expected wages are equal across sectors for two 
reasons. First, future ex-post wages will be equalized across sectors by the next generation. Second, expected effect 
of new technologies on workers’ incomes is equal, since technical progress is independent of sector. 
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only . Thus, wages of old workers trapped in their former professions are lower 
than wages of young or of old who retrain. Furthermore, wages of these workers are negatively 
related to sector technical progress. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Technical 
progress increases productivity in a sector, which does not lead to higher wages in the sector, due 
to labor mobility of young workers, but it increases entry of young workers to the sector. Hence, 
supply of the intermediate good increases, and its relative price falls. This reduces the income of 
old workers in this sector who do not retrain. 
tittiti bwpa ,,1, /=−
3.2. Early Retirement, Retraining or Business as Usual 
We next turn to analyze decisions in the second period of life. An older worker chooses between 
three alternatives: retrain, not retrain but work, and retire. Utility if the worker retrains is 
(10)  [ ].)()1(log 1 fLwrw tt −++−
Utility if the worker does not retrain and uses the old technology is 
(11) .)1(log
,
1 


 ++−
ti
t
t b
wLrw  
Utility if retires is 
(12) [ ] [ ].)1)(1(log)1log()1(log 11 hrwhrw tt ++=+++ −−  
Comparing utilities leads to the worker’s choice. He prefers to retrain if: 
(13) .
111
,
,
, ti
ti
ti b
b
L
b
Lf
−=


 −≤  
The RHS of (13) is bounded by L/2 and hence is bounded by F. Clearly retraining rises with L, 
the length of career horizon, as it affects the incentive to retrain. This is why our model of human 
capital erosion applies mainly to older workers with low L. The conditions for staying in work 
and not retiring are the following. If (13) holds, the worker retrains and works if: 
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(14) )(
1
1
1
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w
w
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t
t −+≤ −
. 
If (13) does not hold the worker does not retrain but keeps working if: 
(15) 
tit
t
b
L
w
w
r
h
,11
1
−+
≤  . 
The decision of older workers is presented in Figure 1, in which workers are distributed 
between 0 and H on the h axis and between 0 and F on the f axis. Lines I, II and III divide them 
according to their choices. Line I is defined by equality in (13). Workers below it retrain and 
workers above it do not. Line II is defined by equality in (14) and line III is defined by equality 
in (15), and they divide workers between retirement and work. The three lines meet at the same 
point. Workers in area A, above I and to the left of III, use the old technology. Workers in area 
B, below I and to the left of II, retrain, and workers in area C, to the right of II and III, retire. The 
probabilities of these three choices are the areas A, B, and C, divided by FH, respectively. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Note that according to our above assumptions all three areas in Figure 1 are positive, and 
so are the probabilities of all three outcomes, if H is sufficiently large. The main qualitative 
results of the model hold even if H or F is smaller, though the size of the effect of technical 
progress might change. 
3.3. The Probability of Working in Old Age 
According to Figure 1, the probability that workers stop working is 
(16) .11
2)1(
1
2
,,1
, 






 −++−= − titit
t
ti b
L
b
F
w
w
rHF
LP  
This probability depends on various variables. The most important one is of course the sector’s 
rate of technical progress, which is our main variable of interest. A rise in bi,t shifts line I up and 
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line III to the left, leaving line II unchanged. As a result area B of retraining increases, area A of 
no retraining decreases, and area C of early retirement increases. Hence, the probability of not 
working or of early retirement rises. This can be shown by direct derivation of (16) as well. 
 The probability of early retirement depends not only on the sector rate of technical 
progress, but on the aggregate rate as well, through the general wage effect . This effect 
is negative, and we return to it in section 3.5. Equation (16) also tells us also how the other 
parameters F, H, L and r affect the probabilities of work and of retirement. The maximum 
training costs F has a positive effect on not working. Intuitively, higher retraining costs reduce 
the incentive to retrain and to stay in the labor market. The maximum utility from retirement H 
also has a positive effect on early retirement, clearly. L has a negative effect on early retirement. 
Intuitively, the longer the work horizon of older workers, the more they gain from working and 
from retraining, and the less they tend to retire. The effect of interest rate r on early retirement is 
positive. Intuitively, wealth accumulation increases consumption of leisure and thus increases 
early retirement. 
1/ −tt ww
 We therefore summarize the above by the following function P, which rephrases (16). 
The probability of not working in sector i in time t is 
(17) . ),,,,,( ,, titti bgrHFLPP =
As shown above: 0,0,0,0,0,0 ><>>>< bgrHFL PPPPPP . 
3.4. The Effect of Sector Technical Progress on Wages 
In this subsection we analyze the effect of the sector’s rate of technical progress on the average 
wage of older workers who keep working. The reason we are interested in this effect is its use in 
the empirical analysis in Section 5. The effect of sector technical progress on wages of workers 
who do not retire is mixed. On one hand, technical progress lowers wages of workers who do not 
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retrain, but on the other hand, it reduces their number relative to those who retrain, which raises 
the average. Hence, the overall effect of technical progress on the average wage is ambiguous. 
In our specific model the average wage of workers who continue to work is: 
(18)                  
( )
( ) .2/2
23/2
,
2
,
3
,
,
3
,
tititi
titi
t bbLFb
bLFb
w +−+
+−+
 
If the sector has no technical progress and bi,t = 1, the average wage equals wt. As bi,t increases, 
the average wage falls and then rises again. If, for example, F = L/2, then the average returns to 
wt again at bi,t = 2. This is shown in Figure 2. Hence, the two effects tend to cancel one another, 
so that the overall effect of technical progress on the average wage is ambiguous and small, 
being close to zero. This result plays an important role in the empirical analysis in Section 5. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
3.5. The Aggregate Effect of Technical Progress 
We next turn to the effect of aggregate technical progress on labor supply of older workers in the 
whole economy. From the above discussion we learn that the average rate of technical progress 
gt has two opposite effects on early retirement. First, there is a negative wage effect, since gt 
raises wages, which increases labor supply of older workers in all sectors. This is shown by 
 in equation (17). The second effect comes from the positive correlation between the 
average and the sectors’ rates of technical progress. A higher g
0<gP
t is correlated with higher sector 
technical progress bi,t and thus with more early retirement and less labor supply in the innovating 
sectors. This is the positive erosion effect. The two effects are seen in the following aggregate 
probability of not working: 
(19)            .11
2)1(
1
1
0
2
,,
,
1
0
,, ∫∫ 






 −++−== dib
L
b
Fne
rFH
LdiPnP
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ti
g
titit
t  
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The numbers ni,t are the sector shares in employment of this generation. The direct negative 
effect of gt is the wage effect. The positive effect of gt through bi,t is the erosion effect. 
In order to get a better understanding of the interaction between the two effects, we use 
the decomposition of sector technical progress to the aggregate and idiosyncratic components 
(3).  Substituting in equation (19) we get after some manipulation: 
(20)  .
22
)(
)1(
1
1
0
2
,
,,∫  ++−+−= −−− die
LeLeLFn
rFH
LP tittttit sgggsgtit  
To examine which effect is stronger under this specification, the wage effect or the erosion 
effect, we calculate the derivative of (20) with respect to the average rate of technical progress gt. 
This derivative is 
(21) .)21(1
2
)()(
)1(
1
0
22
,,
1
0
,,
,,







 +−−−−+=∂
∂ ∫∫ −−− diesneLdinesFLrFH LgP tittttit sggtitigtisgtitt  
Examination of this derivative shows that its sign is ambiguous and depends mainly on F. In 
Section 6 we take this issue to the US data. We examine the effect of the average rate of 
technical progress on the rate of labor participation by old, which is precisely 1 , to see which 
effect is stronger, the positive wage effect or the negative erosion effect. 
tP−
 
4. Testing the Empirical Implications of the Model 
We conduct a series of tests of the empirical implications of our theory, using available US data. 
We start by estimating a simple Probit model, where the dependent variable is ‘not working’ on a 
sample of men age 50-64. To check the robustness of the results, we estimate alternative 
specifications, such as using alternative dependent variables, utilizing only sub-groups of the 
sample, and estimating a random effect model. These attempts isolate the various effects of 
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sector-specific technical progress on the supply of labor by older men. To test for reverse 
causality, we also look at estimates from wage regressions. Finally, we use aggregate US data to 
examine the time-series relationship between the average rate of technical progress and the 
aggregate labor participation rate of men age 55-64, using a “structural” VAR model.  
 In Section 5 we present estimates of a reduced-form specification of equation (16), 
according to which the probability of early retirement of older workers depends on the rate of 
technical progress in their sector logbi,t, and on the parameters L, F, H, and r. Therefore, we 
estimate a Probit panel regression over three periods of the HRS data set, of the form 
(22)    jZ tjtjtjt SI ,,,, εδγ ++= , 
where γ and δ are vectors of parameters to be estimated. The dependent variable Zj,t is indicator 
for ‘not working.’ The explanatory variables are divided to two: a vector  of personal time-
varying and time-invariant characteristics, and a vector S
tjI ,
j,t of indicators of the performance of the 
sector in which the individual held his last main job. We define the variable last main job as the 
most recent job, in which the worker has stayed for at least 5 years, and it is set anew each 
survey year. We next discuss in more detail the empirical counterparts of the theoretical model 
variables, beginning with the dependent variable, the probability of early retirement. 
Finding empirical counterparts to the decisions of older workers in the model poses two 
main problems. The first is that we do not observe on-the-job training, which is the prevalent 
form of retraining. Thus, our data do not distinguish between retraining and keeping the old 
technology. Hence, our estimation lumps these two states together into one state. The second 
problem is that while in our model workers decide when to quit, in reality and in the data a 
worker can be fired as well.9 We therefore use the fact that the data contain more information on 
                                                 
9 See Appendix, Table A1 for the distribution of reasons for leaving a job. 
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not working statuses, and in addition to ‘not working’, we also estimate equation (22) with 
unemployment and retirement as alternative dependent variables.10 Our data show that being 
unemployed is often a first stage in a process of leaving work, as laid-off older workers first 
search for a job, despair after some time and drop from the labor force permanently.  
 The main explanatory variable in this test is the sector’s rate of technical progress, logbi,t. 
Of course, this variable is not directly observed. We use instead the rate of growth of total factor 
productivity (TFP) per sector. Although it has been found by Bartel and Sicherman (1993) to be 
a good measure of technical progress, it has some problems. The main problem is that it reflects 
not only technical progress, but also other shocks that affect utilization. This problem is dealt in a 
number of ways. First, we subtract aggregate TFP growth from sector TFP growth to eliminate 
aggregate demand shocks. Second, we average TFP growth rates over periods of 5 years. Third, 
we add sector output growth to the estimation to control for sector-specific demand shocks. 
The other parameters of equation (16) are approximated by personal characteristics that 
are observed in the data. Thus, age is a good indicator for the length of work horizon, L. Health 
is an indicator for the utility from ‘not-working’ H, and the inverse of education is an indicator 
for F, which describes the effort required to learn new technologies. The interest rate r, affects 
early retirement through accumulation of past wealth. Luckily, our data contains information on 
personal accumulated wealth as well as on pension funds. Both wealth and pension status are 
expected to have a positive effect on retirement. 
The sector empirical analysis contains not only tests of equation (16) but tests of equation 
(18) as well, namely of how the average wage of the older workers, who continue to work, is 
related to the sector's rate of technical progress. This test examines the possibility of reverse 
                                                 
10 We also estimate a multinomial logit model with the three disjoint states working, unemployed and retried. In 
general, this model yields similar results to the Probit regression. To save space, we do not present them. 
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causality, namely that sectors with high rates of early retirement are more efficient, because they 
can get rid of less productive old workers, and have a higher rate of TFP growth as a result. This 
reverse causality hypothesis implies that wages of old workers in more productive sectors should 
be higher, contrary to the prediction of equation (18), that the effect of sector TFP growth on 
wages of old workers is ambiguous. This issue is also examined with the cross section data set.  
The empirical work concludes with a structural VAR estimation of equation (20). This is 
done by using time-series aggregate data on technical progress and on labor participation of older 
workers in the US. We use these data to test which effect has been stronger in the post World 
War II period, the erosion effect or the wage effect. In this test we further improve the 
identification of technical progress by breaking up aggregate TFP growth into permanent and 
temporary shocks and by identifying the permanent shocks with technical progress. 
 
5. The Effects of Technical Progress across Sectors 
5.1. The Data  
The main data source that we use is the first three interviews (1992, 1994, and 1996) of the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which contains detailed micro information on a large group 
of individuals of age 50 and above. The HRS gathered information on their jobs and career 
histories during the 10 years prior to the 1992 interview. In the regression analysis, we restrict 
ourselves to men who were between 50 and 64 in the years of interviews, and who were in the 
labor-force two years prior to the present interview date, ending up with 13,471 observations of 
5,217 individuals. We merge the HRS with Jorgenson’s (2000) data set that measures output, 
input factors, and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for 35 economic sectors, from 1970 to 1996. 
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 Table 1 presents labor status shares across the three interviews, for three separate age 
groups: 50-54, 55-59, and 60-64. The results in Table 1 confirm that non-working is quite 
common for men in their early fifties (20% compared with less than 5% for men 40-45 years old) 
and increases steadily to over 50% in the older group. The reasons for not working are very 
heterogonous.11 Note that retirement becomes the major status among the non-working men only 
after age 60, whereas in the 55-60 group between 11 to 14 percent are retired, while 15-16 
percent are unemployed or disabled. The share of retirement climbs to more than 35 percent for 
men in the 60-64 group, while the combined share of the other three not-working groups 
decreases to about 12 percent.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Contrary to retirement rates, unemployment rates decrease with age, from 5.1 percent in 
the younger age group to 2.3 percent in the older age group. Interestingly, these figures are much 
lower than the overall unemployment rates in the US at that time (7.5 percent in 1992 and 5.4 
percent in 1996). Using transition matrix analysis, we find that most unemployed older workers 
are retired by the next interview, suggesting that unemployment is a transitional state between 
work and retirement. This result, combined with the fact that the share of disabled workers seems 
to be unaffected by age and by economic variables, leads us to focus on ‘not-working’ as the 
main indicator of early retirement. In addition, we also estimate the determinants of 
unemployment, and of official retirement. 
 Most of the covariates in the vector  have been determined many years prior to the 
survey and can be considered to be exogenous to the decision of working or not. Such variables 
are age, race, immigration status, marital status and education. Other covariates, like pension 
tjI ,
                                                 
11 See Table A1 in the Appendix on reasons for not working in the first HRS interview. 
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status, union membership, and accumulated net wealth have also been determined in the past but 
might be affected by more recent decisions. Since these variables might also be correlated with 
sector, we add them only to some of the regressions to check robustness. Another variable in  
is profession in last main job, whether it has been a production or non-production profession.
tjI ,
12 
This variable is added to some of the regressions to test for interaction with technical progress. 
 The sector variables (Sj,t) are related to the last main job. We match the sector reported in 
the HRS, which has 14 sectors, to the relevant sectors in the Jorgensen data set, which has 35 
sectors. The main variable we use is a proxy for the sector’s rate of technical progress, which is 
derived from the rate of TFP growth. Since TFP growth is not identical to technical progress, as 
discussed in Section 4, we use some manipulation. We use the average rate of TFP growth in the 
sector during the 5 years prior to the relevant year of survey and subtract from it the average rate 
of TFP growth for all sectors during this period. The TFP growth rate differs significantly across 
sectors and over time.13 Since TFP growth might reflect demand changes in addition to technical 
progress, we add to most regressions sector output growth as an additional explanatory variable 
in order to control for such demand effects. 
5.2. Labor Status Regressions 
Table 2 and Table A2 present the main results of this test. Table 2 focuses on the effects of TFP 
growth on labor status, while Table A2 reports the effects of the entire control variables from six 
representative regressions. Given the nonlinear form of the conditional expectation function 
associated with the Probit regression model, the quantitative magnitude of the effects of technical 
progress is not transparent from the coefficient estimates in Table A2. Thus, column 1 of Table 2 
                                                 
12 The professions we classify as production are: farming, forestry, fishing, mechanics and repair, construction, 
trade, extractors, machine operators, handlers and health services. The non-production professions are: managerial, 
high professional, sales, clerical, administrative, various services and members of armed forces.   
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reports the effect of a one percentage-point increase in TFP growth on the absolute probability of 
‘not working’. It therefore reports exactly the empirical equivalent of the model derivative of 
equation (16), calculated by using the normal density at the sample means. Formally: 
(23)  growthTFP
statuslabor SI
growthTFP
P δδγφδ ˆ)ˆˆ(
)(
* +=∂
∂= , 
where φ  is the normal density. Columns 2 and 3 report comparable estimates for two subgroups 
of ‘not-working’, namely ‘unemployed’ and ‘retired,’ giving us a profound view on the entire 
process of exiting from the labor force by old workers. 
For robustness check, each column reports estimates from 7 different specifications. The 
basic model includes the exogenous personal control variables and the sector variables TFP 
growth and output growth. The second model adds three more personal variables: wealth, union 
membership, and pension fund membership (we include these three variables also in Models 3-
7). The third model excludes sector’s output growth, and the fourth focuses on younger men in 
ages 50-60 only, to examine the effect of age. The fifth is a random-effects model. The sixth and 
seventh regressions test if TFP growth has different effects on early retirement for production 
and for non-production workers. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The effect of TFP growth on ‘not working’, across the seven models, is always positive. 
Furthermore, as we explain below, the differences in the magnitude of the effect (and the level of 
significance) provide compelling evidence to support our main hypothesis, that technical 
progress pushes many older workers in these industries out of work, mainly to unemployment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 In 1992, the sector TFP growth ranged from –0.1% to 4% (mining), with an average of 0.6% and standard error of 
1.3%. In 1996, the leading sector was agriculture with 2%, the average was 0.2%, and the standard error 1.1%.  
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The magnitudes of these effects are quite significant, as a one-percent increase in TFP decreases 
the probability of employment by about 1.58 percentage-points in the basic model. 
A more detailed examination of the results yields some further interesting conclusions. 
First, the effect of technical progress becomes weaker when we control for wealth, pension, and 
union membership in model 2. One possible explanation can be that wealthier workers have 
higher ability and thus are more likely to retrain. Another explanation is a possible correlation 
between the wealth variables and sector, if sectors with better wage and pension conditions have 
higher rates of technical progress as well. But even with these variables added, the effect of TFP 
growth on ‘not working’ is still negative, which points to robustness. 
Not surprisingly, the erosion effect is weaker when we restrict the sample to younger men 
in ages 50-60. Indeed, the effect of technical progress on early retirement is even not significant 
for this group. However, the positive effect on unemployment is even stronger than the effect for 
the full sample. We take advantage of the panel structure of the data and run a random-effect 
model (Model 5) to check for robustness and find that even when controlling for unobserved 
individual effects, the main results of the model remain unchanged. 
Models 6 and 7 provide more support to our hypothesis that the positive correlation 
between not working and technical progress is driven by erosion of human capital. These models 
test the effects of technical progress on production and non-production workers separately. 
Production workers usually use the more specific technologies of the sector, while non-
production workers tend to use more general technologies of management and services. Hence, 
production workers are expected to suffer more from erosion of human capital related to sector 
specific technologies. The empirical results support it, as the effect on non-production workers is 
not significant, while the effect on production workers is stronger than the average effect.  
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Column 2 in Table 2 presents similar effects on unemployment. The magnitudes are 
lower than for ‘not-working’, but the significance level is higher. In general, the changes across 
the models are similar to those in the first column with the exception of the younger group, 
which happens to be more sensitive to technical growth than older workers. The effect of TFP 
growth on retirement is weaker, and except for the basic model is not significant. This fits the 
above observation that quite commonly unemployment is a first stage in becoming retired. 
Hence, unemployment is sensitive to technical change, while official retirement responds with a 
delay, which we are unable to identify its length with our regression analysis. 
Finally, while our primary interest is in the labor supply response to technical progress, 
we briefly summarize the estimated effects of the other control variables. Our findings, as 
reported in Table A2, conform with Costa (1998), Peracchi and Welch (1994) and Bartel and 
Sicherman (1993), despite the use of different data sets. Our results fit most of the model 
predictions. Schooling has a negative effect on unemployment and on early retirement and bad 
health has a strong positive effect on early retirement, while it does not have a significant effect 
on unemployment. We also find, as in other studies, that wealth and pension tend to lengthen 
work at the individual level, which contradicts our model. We can think of two possible 
explanations for this finding. One is that these variables capture some individual innate ability, 
which is related to retraining ability. The other explanation is that wealth and pension status are 
job and sector related and thus capture some sector characteristics. 
5.3. Testing for Reverse Causalities 
This sub-section examines the possibility that the positive correlation found between sector TFP 
growth and retirement is due to reverse causality. This might occur if sectors differ by how many 
old workers they lay-off during reorganization. Since firms tend to keep only the best workers, 
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reorganization might increase productivity. This too can create a positive correlation between 
sector TFP growth and not working. To test this possibility we do two things, first, include sector 
output growth in the tests of labor status, as reported in Table 2, and second, test for the effect of 
sector TFP growth on wages of those who continue to work. 
If higher productivity is caused by lay-offs, then early retirement and high TFP should 
also be positively correlated with reductions in demand and in output. As mentioned above, the 
sector’s output growth is included in six of the models in Table 2. Comparing the estimation 
without output growth in Model 3 to the other models shows that the coefficient of TFP growth 
is almost unchanged, going up from 0.79 to 0.86. Furthermore, the correlation between sector’s 
TFP growth and sector’s output growth is almost zero. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that TFP 
growth is due to lay-off of older workers seems less likely. 
The second and main test for reverse causality examines the effect of TFP growth on 
wages of workers who continue to work. Under the reverse hypothesis, remaining workers 
should have higher wages in sectors with more lay-offs, which get rid of unproductive workers. 
Hence, under reverse causality we expect a positive correlation between TFP growth and wages, 
while according to our erosion model this correlation is close to zero, as shown in Section 3.4. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 presents the regressions for four specifications of the wage equation. The main 
result of all regressions is that the effect of TFP growth on wages is not significant. In two 
specifications the coefficients are negative and in the other two are positive, but in all cases we 
are unable to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. Interestingly, this effect on wages 
of old workers contrasts the strong positive effect of technical progress on wages of young 
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workers, found by Bartel and Sicherman (1999) and others. Note, that the effect of sector output 
growth, which represents demand shifts, is not significant as well. 
In this analysis we should be aware of the possibility of self-selection, as we test for the 
wages of those who have chosen to continue working. We control for self-selection using the 
Heckman procedure in Model 4, and the main result is still unchanged. Note that the results in 
the selection equation are similar to those of Model 2 in Table A2. As our model predicts that 
retraining increases hourly wages of workers that choose to retrain, the results of the Heckman 
selection model suggest that retraining is not common within this sample of old workers. 
The other results of the wage equations are in line with the standard literature. The 
positive coefficient of wealth supports our above hypothesis that this variable is correlated with 
innate individual ability. To conclude, the results of these tests demonstrate a rejection of the 
possibility of reverse causality and support the robustness of our results on the erosion effect.  
 
6. The Effect of Aggregate Technical Progress in the US 
This section examines the relationship between the average rate of technical progress and the 
aggregate rate of labor participation of older workers. While Section 5 provides cross sectional 
evidence on the erosion effect, this section examines how strong this erosion effect is in the 
economy as a whole, by weighing it against the wage effect. This is done by testing the 
relationship over time between the labor participation rate of older workers and the rate of 
technical progress. The main empirical problem we face is that, we do not directly observe 
technical progress but only Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The latter consists of two 
components: technical progress and transitory changes in productivity. In order to decompose the 
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rate of total factor productivity growth between these two components, we apply the Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) method of Structural VAR. 
Before applying the Structural VAR model, we present the data and discuss the relation 
between the two main variables, the rate of Growth of Total Factor Productivity (GTFP) and the 
rate of Growth of Labor Force Participation of Older workers (GLFPO). We calculate the series 
of GTFP by using Jorgenson (2000) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) US annual data in 1948-
1996, and construct the series of GLFPO for the same years by using data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2000). The series of GLFPO is calculated by taking logarithm changes of LFP 
rates of men between the ages 55-64. During the sample period, the index of TFP has increased 
from 0.89 to 1.34, at an average annual rate of 0.7 percent. Labor force participation of all 
working-age men (16-64) has decreased from 78.5 to 70.5 percent, and most of this decline is 
due to lower participation of older men, which has dropped from 86.7 percent to 62.6 percent. 
[Insert Figures 3-A and 3-B here] 
  A simple analysis of the data reveals interesting relations between productivity changes 
and labor force participation rates. The correlation between GLFP for all working-age men (ages 
16-64) and GTFP in the US from 1948 to 1996 is 0.3, while the same correlation for older men, 
between GLFPO and GTFP is only 0.04. These relations are also manifested in Figures 3-A and 
3-B, which display series of annual changes of LFP of men of age 16-64, of men of age 55-64, 
and of GTFP. The figures show, similar to the simple unconditional correlation, that GLFP of all 
men and GTFP are positively correlated, while GLFPO and GTFP are not correlated. 
 We next turn to describe the Structural VAR model, which we use to decompose TFP 
growth to technical changes and to transitory changes. While the theoretical model assumes for 
simplicity that productivity is driven solely by technical progress, in reality it is also affected by 
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other shocks, mostly demand driven. In the following empirical model we allow for such shocks 
and assume that they are temporary, while technology shocks are permanent. We therefore 
assume that the two observed variables, the rate of Growth of Total Factor Productivity (GTFP) 
and the rate of Growth of Labor Force Participation of Older workers (GLFPO) are both 
functions of two disturbances: ε1t and ε2t. The first disturbance reflects transitory changes in 
productivity, while the second is the rate of technical progress, namely gt from the model. Hence, 
the joint dynamics of GTFP and GLFPO follow this stationary process: 
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The random variables ε1t and ε2t are assumed to be independent white-noise disturbances with 
constant variances, and the C(L)’s are polynomials in the lag operator L. 
Since the model is stationary we can estimate a reduced form VAR representation of the 
form: 
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where A(L) is the matrix of the coefficients estimated, and e1t and e2t are the VAR residuals. We 
then calculate the moving average representation of the VAR: 
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In the next stage we use the Blanchard and Quah (1989) method to recover the ε’s and the C(L)’s 
from this VAR estimation, by using the identifying restriction that only technical progress shocks 
have permanent effects on TFP, while transitory productivity shocks have temporary effects. 
In order to use this method we first test the crucial assumption, that both variables are 
derived from stationary processes, by using the Dickey-Fuller test. We reject the null hypothesis 
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of a unit root for each of the two variables (at 1-percent significance level), empirically 
motivating the VAR specification of equations (24) and (25). Then we estimate several 
specifications of lags, and find that the specification AR(2) fits the data better than others.14 
Using the restriction on the effect of the temporary coefficient on TFP we identify the ε’s and the 
C(L)’s. This enables us to calculate the Impulse Response Functions of the two variables.   
[Insert Figures 4-A and 4-B here] 
Figures 4-A and 4-B display two representations of the dynamic responses of labor force 
participation of older workers to technical progress. Figure 4-A displays the Impulse Response 
Function of GLFPO to a unit change at period zero in ε2t.  In response to a positive technology 
shock of one percent, GLFPO experiences an immediate decrease of 0.6 percent. After two 
periods, the growth rate stabilizes and converges to zero after 6-7 periods. We therefore conclude 
that according to this test of US data, the erosion effect is strong and dominates the wage effect. 
Interestingly recent studies have shown that technology shocks have a negative effect on 
employment in general, as shown by Gali (1999) and other studies he cites. We find that this 
effect holds mainly for older workers. We have run a similar SVAR test for workers in ages 16-
64, and found a smaller and less persistent negative effect to technical progress on labor 
participation. Hence, our analysis can provide an explanation to the findings by Gali (1999) and 
others on the negative effect of technology shocks on employment. 
According to our theoretical model the effect of technical progress on labor force 
participation of the old is temporary, so it explains fluctuations of labor force participation 
around trend, rather than the trend itself. But our empirical analysis shows that the effect of 
technical progress is quite persistent and lasts quite long. Figure 4-B illustrates this, by 
displaying the effect of a one-period one-percent shock of ε2 in 1949 on the level of labor force 
                                                 
 14 The results of the VAR estimation are in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
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participation of men in ages 55-64 over the next 15 years. The upper line in the figure displays 
the actual rates, while the lower line displays the calculated series. The calculation includes an 
adjustment for annual entry of new men to the 55-64 years age group. Figure 4-B shows that the 
negative effect of the shock remains significant for many years and the two lines meet only after 
more than twenty years. A unit technology shock in 1949 would have reduced the 1955’s LFP of 
men age 55-64 by 0.7 percentage points, by 0.5 in 1960, and by 0.3 percentage points in 1965. 
Thus, the negative effect of aggregate technology shocks on LFPO persists over a long period.15 
The persistence of the effect of technical progress on labor force participation means that 
it can also serve as one of the explanations to the observed decline in LFP of older workers in 
recent decades, in addition to increased social security coverage, as Diamond and Gruber (1999) 
suggest. During the sample period, TFP increased by 45 percentage points, from 0.89 to 1.34, 
and LFP of older men decreased by 24 percentage points, from 86.7 to 62.6. Our results suggest 
that a sequence of positive technology shocks may have contributed to this decline. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper combines two distinct lines of research from two different areas in economics. One is 
the study of technical progress, which is usually related to economic growth and productivity, 
and the other is labor participation of older workers in labor economics. We combine these two 
areas together by observing that technical progress has a substantial negative effect on labor 
participation rates of older workers, as it erodes technology-specific human capital mostly for 
older workers, who have a shorter career horizon. We describe the erosion effect by a simple 
                                                 
 15 Our calculation underestimates the negative effect of technical progress, as we assume that new entrants to the 
group of 55-64 years old are not affected by technical progress, while they might to some extent. 
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growth model and then test it across sectors in the US. We find that technical progress has a 
negative effect on employment of older workers. 
At the aggregate level our model identifies an additional effect to the negative erosion 
effect, which is the positive wage effect. But using US data, we find that in the years 1950-1996 
the erosion effect has dominated the wage effect, namely that years of high technical progress 
were characterized by reduced labor force participation of older workers. This means that the 
erosion of human capital in the innovating sectors has been stronger than the positive incentive 
to work by higher wages due to technical progress across the economy. 
This paper therefore indicates that the erosion effect is potent and merits further research. 
Can we measure it by analyzing labor dynamics of workers across jobs and how related they are 
to technical progress? Can differences in educational and training systems explain international 
differences in labor participation? These and related questions are still waiting to be answered.  
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Table 1: Work Status by Years and Age
1992 1994 1996
50-54 55-59 60-64 50-54 55-59 60-64 50-54 55-59 60-64
In the Labor Force
     Working 80.1 70.0 48.9 79.7 72.1 49.1 81.8 73.9 49.7
     Unemployed 5.5 5.6 2.4 5.5 5.0 2.9 1.3 4.2 1.6
Out of the Labor Force
     Disabled 8.7 10.4 8.8 10.6 11.6 11.8 9.3 10.8 10.2
     Retired 5.5 13.8 39.8 3.8 11.2 35.9 5.0 11.0 38.5
     Other 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
No. of 
Observations 1,811 2,451 1,053 837 2,320 1,394 77 2,164 1,599
Data Source: Employment section of HRS, waves 1-3 (1992-1996)
Table 2: The Effect of TFP Growth on the Probability of Early Retirement
Model Not-Working Unemployed Retired
1) Basic Model  1.58 0.46 0.52
(0.35) (0.12) (0.27)
2) 0.79 0.39 0.15
(0.35) (0.11) (0.26)
3) 0.86 0.37 0.13
(0.35) (0.11) (0.26)
4) Age 50-60 0.57 0.50 -0.12
(0.37) (0.15) (0.23)
5) 0.82 0.39 0.16
(0.28) (0.16) (0.22)
6) 0.54 0.29 -0.12
(0.45) (0.17) (0.41)
7) 1.14 0.46 0.33
(0.54) (0.14) (0.32)
0.329 0.042 0.175
Notes:
4) The number of observation in models 1, 2, 3 and 5 is 13,471; in model 4 is 9,490; in model 6 is 8,280; and 
in model 7 is 5,191.
3) Appendix A2 reports the full set of coefficients for the Probit regressions of "Not-Working" and 
"Unemployed", models 1, 2 and 5.
 where we use the normal density, and the effects are evaluated at the sample means.
With Wealth, Union 
and Pension
Without Output 
Growth
Non-Production 
Workers
Production Workers
Random-Effect Model
Marginal effect on the probability of:
1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients, at 5% level, are in bold .
2) The calculation were done using the Probit parameters estimated for Equation 21. The formula used to 
calculate the effect of a 1 percentage-point increase in TFP growth on the probability to be in non-labor 
status I is
Means of Dependent 
Variables
,)(* ii δφδ •=
Table 3: Coefficient Estimates for Ln Wage Equations
Wage 
Equation
Selection on 
Working
Sector TFP Growth -0.641 -0.167 2.648 1.173 -2.26
(0.801) (0.762) (3.107) (0.856) (0.955)*
Sector Output Growth 0.918 -0.625 -0.689 1.259 -4.478
(0.626) (0.598) (2.001) (0.682) (0.815)**
Age 0.238 0.169 0.217 -0.209 0.749
(0.076)** (0.072)* (0.075)** (0.081)** (0.092)**
Age-square -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.007
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
African American -0.106 -0.081 -0.106 -0.072 -0.126
(0.029)** (0.027)** (0.028)** (0.031)* (0.034)**
Hispanic -0.12 -0.049 -0.111 -0.129 0.043
(0.041)** (0.039) (0.040)** (0.0439)** -0.05
Foreign Born -0.013 0.028 0.009 -0.094 0.274
(0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.037)* (0.045)**
Currently Married 0.161 0.089 0.156 0.089 0.09
(0.026)** (0.024)** (0.026)** (0.028)** (0.032)**
Years of Schooling 0.064 0.051 0.061 0.060 -0.012
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.005)*
College Degree 0.168 0.124 0.162 0.159 0.038
(0.029)** (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.031)** -0.037
Regions:
   Central -0.084 -0.054 -0.073 -0.120 0.145
(0.028)** (0.027)* (0.028)* (0.031)** (0.037)**
   South-East -0.175 -0.095 -0.166 -0.161 0.102
(0.026)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.028)** (0.033)**
   Pacific -0.086 -0.066 -0.071 -0.065 0.034
(0.032)** (0.030)* (0.032)* (0.034) -0.041
Bad Health -0.213 -0.163 -0.208 -0.104 -0.592
(0.028)** (0.027)** (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.030)**
Year 1994 -0.002 -0.021 -0.003 0.013 -0.07
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029)*
Year 1992 -0.095 -0.115 -0.084 -0.191 0.192
(0.024)** (0.023)** (0.027)** (0.026)** (0.031)**
Union Member  0.045 0.086
(0.022)* (0.031)**
Pension Plan 0.429 0.701
(0.020)** (0.026)**
Total Net -Wealth 0.055 0.001
(0.002)** (0.000)**
Constant 3.153 4.923 3.433 15.593 -19.743
(2.176) (2.063)* (2.153) (2.342)** (2.684)**
R-square 0.15 0.24 0.17 NA NA
Observations 7,897 7,897 7,897 13,471 13,471
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Data Source:  HRS, waves 1-3 (1992-1996)
4. Heckman Selection Model1. Basic 
Model
 2. Include 
Wealth 
Variables
3. Include 
Sector 
Dummies
Table A1: Reasons Respondent Left Previous Job (percent)
50-54 55-60  60-64 All 50-54 55-60 60-64 All
Business Closed 13.0 13.4 5.6 10.6 21.2 25.2 27.8 24.0
Laid-Off or Let-Go 21.7 18.2 10.6 16.3 12.4 13.7 12.2 13.0
Family Reasons 
(health, moved...) 21.4 18.1 9.0 15.6 8.3 6.9 5.1 7.2
Better Job 9.0 7.3 6.4 7.3 29.4 24.8 25.1 26.7
Quit 11.4 6.8 5.6 7.3 23.9 21.2 16.4 21.6
Retired 23.4 36.3 62.8 42.7 4.7 8.2 13.4 7.6
No. of observations 299 659 500 1,458 900 1,088 335 2,323
People working in 1992People not working in 1992
Note:  Sources are questions 3612-3619 in the Job History section of  the HRS Wave 1.  The questions: "Why did 
you leave this employer (Did the business close, were you laid off or let go, did you leave to take care of family 
members, did you find a better job, ... or what)"?
Table A2: Probit Estimates for Table 2
Not-Working Unemployed
Model 1 Model 2 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 5
Sector TFP Growth 4.486 2.189 4.964 6.071 5.478 8.009
(1.003) (1.03) (2.124) (1.580) (1.596) (2.413)
Sector Output Growth 1.907 3.354 5.064 -5.244 -4.566 -6.146 
(0.869) (0.887) (1.746) (1.357) (1.365) (2.031)
Age -0.927 -0.922 -1.511 0.650 0.672 0.971
(0.096) (0.099) (0.163) (0.171) (0.173) (0.239)
Age-square 0.009 0.009 0.014 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
African American (0.201) 0.194 0.370 0.134 0.098 0.142
(0.035) (0.037) (0.082) (0.055) (0.056) (0.086)
Hispanic 0.016 -0.019 0.006 0.157 0.117 0.171
(0.053) (0.054) (0.12) (0.076) (0.077) (0.119)
Foreign Born 0.244 -0.298 -0.518 0.205 0.184 0.250
(0.048) (0.05) (0.11) (0.068) (0.068) (0.106)
Currently Married 0.282 -0.215 -0.285 -0.320 -0.264 -0.304 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.067) (0.048) (0.049) (0.073)
Years of Schooling 0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.029 -0.021 -0.027 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
College Degree 0.067 -0.058 -0.101 -0.016 0.037 0.053
(0.039) (0.04) (0.09) (0.066) (0.067) (0.103)
Regions:
   Central 0.111 -0.128 -0.218 -0.229 -0.244 -0.340 
(0.038) (0.04) (0.088) (0.065) (0.066) (0.102)
   South-East 0.078 -0.134 -0.207 -0.101 -0.135 -0.168 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.08) (0.055) (0.057 (0.088)
   Pacific 0.054 0.019 -0.001 -0.071 -0.063 -0.092 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.097) (0.068) (0.069) (0.107)
Bad Health 0.921 0.819 1.074 -0.022 -0.101 -0.109 
(0.029) (0.03) (0.055) (0.049) (0.050) (0.070)
Year 1994 0.057 0.018 -0.015 0.115 0.109 0.137
(0.031) (0.032) (0.044) (0.054) (0.055) (0.069)
Year 1992 0.034 -0.079 -0.147 0.145 0.114 0.161
(0.032) (0.033) (0.051) (0.055) (0.056) (0.073)
Union Member  0.014 0.017 0.085 0.123
(0.04) (0.087) (0.066) (0.100)
Pension Plan -0.840 -1.450 -0.430 -0.564 
(0.032) (0.075) (0.054) (0.084)
Total Net Wealth -0.018 -0.035 -4.132 -5.563 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.084) (1.262)
Constant 23.537 23.935 37.283 -18.758 -19.102 -27.832 
(2.795) (2.901) (4.754) (4.927) (4.986) (6.912)
Log-Likelihood Function -7,218 -6,721 -5,997 -2,208 -2,156 -2,075
No. of Individuals 5,217 5,217 5,217 5,217 5,217 5,217
No. of Person-Years 13,471 13,471 13,471 13,471 13,471 13,471
Note: standard errors are in parentheses
GTFP GLFPO
Panel A: Growth of TFP (GTFP)
T-1 0.113     -0.528**
(0.143) (0.198)
T-2   0.239* 0.004
(0.133) (0.195)
Panel B: Growth of Labor Force 
Participation of Men 55-64 (GLFPO)
T-1      0.263**      0.646**
(0.098) (0.136)
T-2    -0.215** -0.015
(0.091) (0.134)
Appendix A3: Estimates of Bivariate VAR for TFP Growth and LFP of 
men 55-64 (U.S. Data)
Notes:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by 
one asterisk (10-percent level), or two asterisks (5-percent level).
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